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A game session in one of the communities.
Background
Recognizing the close links between poverty and natural 
resource degradation, India invested more than US$ 
500 million during the 1990s (Farrington et al., 1999) 
and more than US$ 1 billion the following decade 
(Deshingkar and Farrington, 2006) in participatory 
watershed development. There is  strong evidence that 
various interventions have the potential to achieve a 
wide range of societal goals such as food security, soil 
protection and efficient water use (Wani et al. 2008; 
Rockström et al. 2010; Garg et al. 2011; Garg et al. 2013; 
Singh et al. 2014; Karlberg et al. 2015). However, despite 
this obvious potential, many communities fail to sustain 
the benefits over time as they struggle to cooperate in 
the joint effort to run and maintain the structures (Wani 
et al. 2008; Joshi et al. 2005). Even though watershed 
projects use participatory approaches, little attention 
is paid to the capacities of communities to design or 
change rules or by-laws and enforce them to ensure 
sustainability of infrastructure investments. Once projects 
are completed it is very common that infrastructure 
quickly erodes losing its capacity to consistently generate 
benefits.
A survey to assess the general state of water 
infrastructure and community attitude towards their 
maintenance was conducted between April to June 2017 
in 90 communities in Mandla district in Madhya Pradesh. 
The results confirm that most communities cannot report 
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Experimental games help communities 
explore solutions 
Key recommendations derived from the study:
1. Communities need locally adapted rules for water 
and water infrastructure management to effectively 
manage water in smarter ways.
2. So far, institutional capacity development in the 
context of watershed projects focuses mainly 
on administrative and facilitation skills. Low-
cost capacity development approaches which 
focus on a participatory formulation of water 
and water infrastructure management rules 
need to be developed and applied. Small-scale 
water infrastructure provides benefits beyond 
the community level. This can justify continuous 
government support to community infrastructure maintenance. Currently support mainly focuses on labor 
(through MNREGA). Communities are, however, more easily able to mobilize labor but struggle to collect 
funds for buying materials.
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More specifically, we studied the potential of using 
experimental games for facilitating social learning and 
innovation. Experimental games are known to have 
the potential to support stakeholders in their decision 
making (Barreteau et al. 2001; Barreteau 2003; Gurung 
et al. 2006; Guyot and Honiden 2006; Becu et al. 
2008; Meinzen-Dick et al. 2016). They can facilitate 
dialogue, shared learning, collective decision making, 
and strengthen the adaptive management capacity of 
local communities (Gurung et al. 2006; Falk et al. 2016). 
The game setting allows to experiment with rules and 
strategies. It limits the costs of trial and error methods 
and shifts the approach from costly ‘learning by doing’ 
towards ‘learning by simulating’ (Barreteau et al. 2001).
The experimental games of our study were carried out 
in 60 communities together with the NGO Foundation 
for Ecological Security and in coordination with the 
respective panchayats (village council) and watershed 
committees. The games are based on a Common Pool 
Resource experiment where players first jointly invest 
into a resource from which they can extract benefits in a 
second step. An important element of our game design 
was the possibility of players to engage in discussions 
and to observe each other’s decisions. Communication 
allows players to negotiate strategies and propose 
rules, strengthen group values and norms, and voice 
commitment. The combination of transparent decisions 
and the possibility to communicate directly addresses 
social norms and shared values which are strong vehicles 
for collective learning (Bravo and Marelli, 2008a). For the 
detailed game design see http://gamesforsustainability.
org/2017/12/21/game-managing-stop-dams-
practitioners/.
Study results
The results of our games show that farmers act less selfish 
than theory predicts. Nevertheless, even in the presence 
of transparent decisions and repeated possibilities to 
discuss, groups manage to produce enough water for 
everyone to grow crops only in approximately 50% of the 
played rounds. The red line in Figure 3 indicates the social 
optimal investment level in our game. At this level, all 
players of a particular group could grow the water-efficient 
rabi (postrainy) crop (chickpea). Still, in 15% of the crop 
decisions in the game, players decided to grow the water-
intensive crop (wheat). It was very transparent in the 
design of our game that this was an uncooperative action.
Players actively discussed the game dynamics such as 
possible responses whenever anybody failed to comply 
with rules agreed upon in the discussion. The natural first 
response was to try to persuade the person. If this did 
not work, some fellow players adjusted their behavior 
and adopted a rather non-cooperative strategy either 
by reducing their investment levels or by choosing the 
water-intensive crop. This can be interpreted as a kind 
of punishment. Others threatened to exclude defectors 
from the group, which was not a credible threat as the 
game design did not accommodate such decisions. Our 
game design did not allow to place any sanctions. The 
general discussion revealed, however, that groups have 
instruments to incentivize cooperation. Interestingly, 
the ultimate sanction is typically not a fine or exclusion 
from dam benefits but staying away from social events. 
We observe that different communities have different 
perceptions regarding what efficiently can encourage 
cooperation. Some groups argued that persuasion is 
sufficient and any threats of sanctions might even have 
Figure 1: Labor contribution to dam maintenance in study villages 
of Madhya Pradesh.
Figure 2: State of water infrastructure in survey villages in Madhya Pradesh.
effective maintenance rules. Hardly any respondent 
reported  financial contributions to the maintenance of 
dams while one quarter said they contributed labor. Labor 
contributions were higher if people received irrigation 
water from the dam (Figure 1). In general, the water 
infrastructure in most of the communities was in a poor 
state (Figure 2). 
Study methodology
Based on these observations we conducted a study 
exploring how the institutional capacity of communities to 
manage and maintain water infrastructure can be improved. 
Figure 3: Boxplot of group investments to dam maintenance in 
the game.
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negative effects. Other groups believed that charging 
defectors with a fee is appropriate. Water and water 
infrastructure governance is more likely to be effective if 
community-specific rules receive space.
The main objective of designing and playing this game 
was to develop the capacity of the players to negotiate 
and formulate water management rules. The feedback 
and the content of the discussions showed us that 
our approach is indeed a suitable tool to reach these 
objectives. Players commonly expressed that the game 
experience made them aware of multiple cooperation 
challenges in the community. They discussed plans to take 
the related issues to the next gram panchayat meetings.
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